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Susan B. Boyd, Dorothy E. Chunn, Fiona Kelly and Wanda 
Wiegers, Autonomous Motherhood? A Socio-Legal Study of 




 Autonomous Motherhood? A Socio-legal Study of Choice and 
Constraint,1 by Susan Boyd, Dorothy Chunn, Fiona Kelly, and 
Wanda Wiegers, explores the evolving social and legal context of 
women who have made the decision to parent without a partner. The 
authors argue that although these single mothers now have more 
economic and social freedom to parent alone, they still confront a 
socio-legal context that challenges their choices. Autonomous 
Motherhood is an important contribution to feminist and socio-legal 
literature. As the authors note, although there is a scholarly tradition 
of studying women who became single mothers by separation, 
divorce, or death of an intimate partner, there is a dearth of 
scholarship on women who have become single mothers by choice. 
The book investigates the social and legal changes in the ways in 
which these single mothers have been treated. Deploying a range of 
disciplinary methodologies—legal, historical, and sociological—the 
authors gather empirical evidence through legislative histories, case-
law analysis, and interviews. The result is a rich interdisciplinary 
socio-legal study of the choices and constraints that have faced 
                                                 
*   Professor of Law and Director, Bonham Centre for Sexual Diversity 
Studies, University of Toronto.  
1  Susan B. Boyd, Dorothy E. Chunn, Fiona Kelly and Wanda Wiegers 
Autonomous Motherhood? A Socio-legal Study of Choice and Constraint 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). 
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women who choose to parent alone.  
 
 Interestingly, the authors choose to present their work as a co-
authored book, rather than an edited collection, even though each of 
the authors takes a lead role in specific chapters. It works; the book 
is beautifully cohesive. Each chapter builds on the ones before, with 
themes seamlessly integrated, telling a theoretically complex and 
nuanced story of choice and constraints. Each of the four authors—
leading feminist socio-legal scholars in Canada and beyond—bring 
their unique perspectives and strengths to Autonomous Motherhood, 
which combines theoretical sophistication, rigorous legal analysis, 
rich historical detail, and compelling sociological interviews. The 
book reads as a paragon of feminist collaboration, where the whole 
is more than the sum of its parts.  
 
 The first chapter on “Motherhood, Autonomy, Choice, and 
Constraint,” for which Susan Boyd was the primary author, provides 
the introduction to the study, setting out the key theoretical and 
methodological objectives and approaches of the book. The authors 
situate their study within the tradition of feminist critical socio-legal 
studies. Their goal in tracing the transformations in the treatment of 
single mothers is twofold: to demonstrate both women’s increased 
choices since the 1970s and the constraints on those choices. The 
authors situate the constraints squarely within the rise of the neo-
liberal state, emphasizing the themes of individual choice, private 
responsibility for social reproduction, and formal equality. They 
situate their approach to the concepts of “choice” and “autonomy” 
within feminist relational theory, which rejects liberal individualism 
in favour of an understanding of autonomy as constrained and 
constructed.2  The chapter provides a brief review of the changing 
                                                 
2  The authors rely here on feminist relational scholarship such as Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Sumi Madhok, Anne 
Philllips & Kalpana Wilson, eds, Gender, Agency, and Coercion 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan UK, 2013); 
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legal and demographic landscape of women who choose to be 
parents without a partner, setting the stage for the chapters that 
follow.  
 
 The next three chapters explore various historical 
transformations in the legal regulation of single women who choose 
to parent without a partner. The second chapter, “Autonomous 
Mothers and the Emergence of Unmarried Fathers’ Rights to Access 
and Custody,” of which Wanda Wiegers was the primary author, 
traces the history of custody and access disputes over children born 
to single mothers. It first examines the status of unmarried fathers 
and mothers to apply for custody and access, beginning with the 
common law, through the legislative reforms in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, up to the 1970s. The second part explores how the 
courts assessed the applications in relation to prevailing concepts of 
the child’s best interests. The chapter shows the shifts in the legal 
treatment of unmarried fathers, from virtually invisible in the 1950s 
towards “almost a presumption of equal parenting” beginning in the 
1990s.  
 
 The third chapter, “A Person is the Child of his Natural Parents: 
Illegitimacy, Law Reform, and Maternal Autonomy,” with Susan 
Boyd again as the primary author, focuses more specifically on the 
legislative history of illegitimacy and its abolition. It begins with a 
focus on the history of financial support obligations and then shifts 
to analyze the discourses of law reform abolishing or minimizing the 
impact of illegitimacy. The chapter does an exemplary job of 
demonstrating the contradictory effects of law:  while removing the 
stigma of illegitimacy from the children and its moralistic regulation 
of women, the reforms also witnessed a greater focus on biological 
fathers and facilitated their claims to custody and access. The 
                                                                                                       
and Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, eds, Relational Autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
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growing emphasis on formal equality between biological mothers 
and fathers would create new constraints on women’s abilities to 
parent autonomously.  
 
 Chapter Four, entitled “Custody and Access Disputes between 
Unmarried, Non-Cohabiting Biological Parents 1945 – 2009,” with 
Wanda Wiegers as the primary author, picks up on the trajectory of 
the previous chapters and focuses attention on the case law. The 
chapter studied 154 cases from four provinces: British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Nova Scotia. It finds that in all 
provinces except Nova Scotia, mothers received sole custody more 
often than men, consistent with the trends for married parents. 
However, the number of successful custody and access claims by 
unmarried fathers increased over time, particularly in the 1990s and 
2000s. The chapter then highlights the factors that seemed to be 
particularly significant in the judicial assessment of a child’s best 
interests in the context of unmarried and non-cohabiting parents, 
including the importance of a relationship with the biological father. 
Increasingly, the courts have enhanced fathers’ claims, emphasizing 
a child’s right to know his or her father and develop a relationship 
with him. As the authors argue, this has come at a cost to women 
who wish to parent autonomously; their choices are constrained as 
they must now often accommodate, negotiate, and facilitate the on-
going involvement of fathers.  
 
 The next two chapters change methodological direction, 
presenting results from interviews with single mothers. Chapter 
Five,  “Women’s Experiences Of Autonomous Motherhood, 1965 – 
2010: An Historical Snapshot,” with Dorothy Chunn as the lead 
author, focuses on women who chose to become single mothers 
between 1960 and 1980. As the authors note, there has been little 
research on this cohort of autonomous mothers, and this chapter 
seeks to begin to fill this knowledge gap. The interviews sought to 
elicit the women’s views on the social, economic, and legal impact 
of their choice to parent alone and their own ideas on the meaning of 
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choice. The chapter organizes the results of the interviews along 
three axes: reproductive autonomy, social reproduction, and formal 
equality, each against the backdrop of the emergent neo-liberal state. 
The authors argue that although the women saw themselves as 
exercising autonomy in their choice to become single mothers, they 
faced significant challenges in terms of the on-going privatization of 
the costs of social reproduction as well as the internalization of some 
more traditional norms of familial ideology. The argument is one 
that is weaved throughout the book—that although women may now 
face fewer challenges than in earlier periods, obstacles remain: “we 
should not automatically conflate historical differences with either 
progress or regression. Women who choose autonomous 
motherhood today may confront fewer overt obstacles and 
discrimination than their predecessors, but in some way, they face 
both old and new roadblocks to making this choice.”3  
 
 Chapter Six, “Autonomous from the Start: The Narratives of 
Single Mothers by Choice,” with Fiona Kelly as the primary author, 
then presents the results of interviews with women who identify as 
Single Mothers by Choice (“SMCs”). The sample was small—only 
ten women were interviewed. Yet the qualitative results were rich 
and an important contribution to a largely under-researched area. 
The interviews focused on how the women made the decision to 
parent alone, their experiences of social or legal barriers to doing so, 
and their experience of autonomous parenting more generally. The 
chapter is structured around a number of themes that emerged in the 
interviews: their entitlement to parent alone, their sense of personal 
responsibility for the costs of social reproduction, their experiences 
of the fertility industry, their views on the importance of biological 
family, and the challenges presented by the legal system. The 
overarching theme of the book is again woven through the chapter: 
although women have more choices to become single mothers, they 
continue to face constraints and obstacles to their autonomy.  
                                                 
3  Boyd et al, supra note 1 at 140.  




 The book concludes with “Whither Autonomous Motherhood? 
Choice and Constraint,” with Susan Boyd once again as the main 
author, who skillfully pulls together the findings and themes, while 
offering some speculations on recent law reform and directions for 
future research. The authors persuasively rearticulate their basic 
argument: that single motherhood has been both enabled and 
constrained over the past decades. On one hand:  
 
The ability of women to exercise choice in 
motherhood has been significantly enhanced over 
recent decades as illegitimacy was largely abolished, 
women gained increased opportunities in the labour 
force, alternative family forms garnered greater social 
and legal acceptance, reproductive technologies 
became more available, and social networks emerged 
for single mothers by choice.4   
 
 Yet on the other hand, these choices remain constrained by a 
range of factors, including the increasing emphasis on the 
importance of biological fathers, dominant conceptions of family, 
and privatized social responsibility. In comparing the two cohorts of 
interviewees from Chapters Five and Six, who chose to become 
single mothers in very different contexts and time periods, the 
authors conclude that “the change has not been as radical as might 
be expected.”5 From the internalization of the strong sense of 
personal financial responsibility to the challenges of reproductive 
technologies, “the commonalities between our two interview cohorts 
may be greater than their differences.”6  
 
                                                 
4  Ibid at 215–216.  
5  Ibid at 217.  
6  Ibid at 218.  
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 The authors then further tease out the contradictory nature of 
law reform demonstrated by their study. While women obtained 
more legal and social autonomy over their reproductive decisions, 
over time “fathers have gained more cultural and legal capital, based 
increasingly on their bio-genetic status rather than a relational 
connection with the child.”7 The advent of formal equality in 
parenting has presented new and formidable challenges to the ability 
of women to parent autonomously.  
 
Autonomy, Neo-liberalism, and Self-Governance  
 
Autonomous Motherhood raises provocative questions not only 
about the legal and social terrain in which single women negotiate 
parenthood but also broader theoretical questions. In this section, I 
engage with three concepts that emerge from the study: autonomy, 
neo-liberalism, and self-governance. The first two are central to the 
book; the third is a lens that I bring to reading the book.  
 
 First, autonomy—which is a central organizing principle of the 
book. The idea of “autonomous motherhood” is intended to capture 
the phenomenon of women who choose to have children—
biologically or by adoption—with no partner. The authors engage in 
a nuanced analysis, framing the question of autonomous motherhood 
in the ambivalent space between choice and coercion. They locate 
their conception of autonomy within the feminist literature on 
relational autonomy. While recognizing the agency of these 
women—and the choices that they make to parent alone—these 
choices are contextualized within the broader context of unequal 
power relationships, institutions, ideologies, and structures. The 
authors maintain a productive tension between choice and constraint, 
with the idea of autonomy vacillating between the poles of choice 
and constraint.  
 
                                                 
7  Ibid at 219.  
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 As a feminist and queer scholar long concerned with principles 
of liberty and freedom, I welcomed the affirmation of women’s 
autonomy with which the book opened and is centrally concerned. 
Yet autonomy—“Autonomous Motherhood?”—remains framed as a 
question. The authors maintain an ambivalent relationship with 
autonomy and choice throughout the book. Often “choice” or 
“autonomy” appear in quotation marks. The language of choice used 
and indeed emphasized by the women in their interviews is 
problematized against the backdrop of the many constraints and 
obstacles that they confronted. It is of course an academic 
imperative to probe beneath the surface; yet the extent to which the 
authors do so seems to depend on what the subjects were expressing. 
Choice was problematized. Constraints, rather less so. The authors 
conclude that women now have more autonomy, yet they also 
downplay the progress, arguing that the commonalities of the 
constraints may outweigh the differences in the degree to which the 
women are able to exercise autonomy. The final chapter is 
interestingly entitled “Whither Autonomy?”—once again, framed as 
a question. It struck me as interesting that the lead would be about 
withering, rather than say, flourishing. While the book certainly 
demonstrates the continuation of structural inequalities within which 
women exercise choices to become single parents, the findings 
equally support a conclusion that these constraints are less than in 
the past—a conclusion that the authors indeed acknowledge and 
affirm. It is perhaps simply a question of emphasis. And my 
inclination would be to weight the enhanced a little more and the 
constrained a little less.  
 
 Having said that, Autonomous Motherhood provides a 
fascinating case study for feminist and other critical scholars 
interested in reconceptualizing autonomy. While the authors 
emphasize the relational dimensions of autonomy, further 
scholarship could delve deeper into more particular 
conceptualizations of relational autonomy revealed in and through 
their study. For example, Mackenzie and Stoljar, whom the authors 
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cite, have meticulously mapped out the field of the multiple feminist 
critiques of autonomy.8  As they write,  
 
The term "relational autonomy," as we understand it, 
does not refer to a single unified conception of 
autonomy but is rather an umbrella term, designating 
a range of related perspectives. These perspectives are 
premised on a shared conviction, the conviction that 
persons are socially embedded and that agents' 
identities are formed within the context of social 
relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting 
social determinants, such as race, class, gender, and 
ethnicity.9 
 
 Autonomous Motherhood certainly shares these basic 
convictions of autonomy as embedded in social relationships: 
autonomy is constituted in and through social relationships. Yet, as 
Mackenzie and Stoljar demonstrate, there are in fact many divergent 
critiques and conceptions of relational autonomy united under this 
basic claim. Several appear to be at play in Autonomous 
Motherhood. There are echoes of the metaphysical relational critique 
that rejects the individualism on which traditional autonomy is 
based, insisting instead on the multiple ways in which individuals 
are “constituted by the social relations in which they stand.”10 There 
is an explicit gesture towards care critiques, such as Jennifer 
Nedelsky’s work: a care critique of traditional autonomy that gives 
normative primacy to relationships of care and focuses on 
                                                 
8  Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 2. 
9  Ibid at 4.  
10  Ibid at 7–8. Mackenzie and Stoljar break down various versions of this 
critique, ultimately arguing that “the concept of individual autonomy 
should be distinguished from individualistic conceptions of individual 
autonomy.” 
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interpersonal relationships.11 The authors repeatedly emphasize the 
idea that “relationships are key to women’s choices about being 
single mothers,” and “constructive supportive relationships are key 
to successful parenting.”12  There is also a heavy reliance on what 
Mackenzie and Stoljar refer to loosely (and somewhat awkwardly) 
as “postmodern critiques,” which focus on the ways in which agency 
is implicated in relations of power and oppression. Autonomous 
Motherhood is very explicitly engaged with the ways in which 
“socio-economic structures . . . can seriously inhibit women’s ability 
to make autonomous choices.”13  
 
 Mackenzie and Stoljar go on to highlight the major themes of 
feminist efforts to reconceptualize relational autonomy. First, there 
is a question of the implications for autonomy of a “richer 
conception of agency:”  
 
For example, conceptualizing agents as emotional, 
embodied, desiring, creative, and feeling, as well as 
rational, creatures highlights the importance to 
autonomy of features of agents that have received 
little discussion in the literature, such as memory, 
imagination, and emotional dispositions and 
attitudes.14 
 
 A second concern is the analysis of the “specific ways in which 
oppressive socialization and oppressive social relationships can 
impede autonomous agency”—a question of central concern to 
Autonomous Motherhood.15 But they further break this concern into 
                                                 
11  Nedelsky, supra note 2. 
12   Boyd et al, supra note 1 at 213.  
13  Ibid at 21. 
14  Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 2 at 21. 
15   Ibid at 22.  
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three interrelated levels: 
 
…the processes of formation of an agent's desires, 
beliefs, and emotional attitudes, including beliefs and 
attitudes about herself. . . . The second level is that of 
the development of the competencies and capacities 
necessary for autonomy, including capacities for self-
reflection, self-direction, and self-knowledge.     . . . 
The third level is that of an agent's ability to act on 
autonomous desires or to make autonomous choices. 
Autonomy can be impeded at this level not just by 
overt restrictions on agents' freedom but also by 
social norms, institutions, practices, and relationships 
that effectively limit the range of significant options 
available to them.”16 
 
 Autonomous Motherhood is clearly, if not always explicitly, 
situated within these various levels of reconceptualizing autonomy. 
It might be analytically productive to further tease out the different 
currents of the critique of autonomy and the reconceptualization of 
relational autonomy along the lines suggested by MacKenzie and 
Stoljar. While Autonomous Motherhood is strong on many of the 
oppressive social relationships that might impede autonomy, the 
formation of autonomous desires and capacities for self-direction 
seem under-developed in the book.  
 
 MacKenzie and Stoljar’s mapping also helps to highlight 
another noticeable absence from Autonomous Motherhood, namely 
the question of affect: emotions and subjectively experienced 
feelings. The absence is ironic perhaps in a study of motherhood, 
saturated as it is in emotionalism. There is no sense of affect of the 
mothers interviewed, yet affect no doubt plays a crucial role in 
decisions related to having, keeping, parenting, and reflecting on 
                                                 
16  Ibid. 
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children. And the question of the formation of affect, the capacity 
for self-reflection on affect, and the ability to act on that affect are 
three levels for further consideration of the relational autonomy of 
women who choose to parent alone. Autonomous Motherhood 
provides a rich legal and sociological case study through which 
future scholarship might delve more deeply into these distinct 
questions of relational autonomy.  
 
 The concept of neo-liberalism is also a central theme running 
through Autonomous Motherhood. “Neo-liberalism” has become a 
capacious term, with multiple, even contradictory, meanings, 
deployed across a broad range of political, economic, sociological, 
and legal literatures. The authors deploy the term without much 
contextualization. It appears in the opening chapter and then 
throughout the book to refer to privatizing financial responsibility, 
individual responsibility for the cost of reproduction, formal 
equality, and gender-neutral family law. While the idea of 
privatizing the costs of social reproduction and individual fiscal 
responsibility are well-established features of the rise of the neo-
liberal state, some other features could have used a bit more 
elaboration. For example, the authors describe father’s rights 
arguments about parity in parenting as “essentially neo-liberal.” It 
may well be—but the claim is asserted rather than elaborated.  
 
 There is also an interesting tension in the arguments about the 
privatization of fiscal responsibility since the 1970s—an argument I 
acknowledge has been directed towards my own scholarship on 
privatization in family law.17 Shelley Gavigan, for example, has 
                                                 
17  For this critique of my work on privatization: Brenda Cossman and Judy 
Fudge, eds, Privatization, Law and the Challenge of Feminism (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002), in particular my chapter “Family 
Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative Visions of the Reprivatization 
Project”; see also Shelley Gavigan “Something Old, Something New? 
Retheorising Patriarch Relations and Privatization from the Outskirts of 
Family Law” (2012) 13 Theor Inq L 271.  
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argued that the claims of privatization radically overstate the extent 
to which the welfare state ever took responsibility for financial 
support:  “The Keynesian approach to social policy and the family 
neither attempted nor sought to dislodge, or render public, the most 
significant source of women's poverty and inequality in the labor 
force: their primary responsibility for the care and wellbeing of their 
children. . . . Primary responsibility for "private" family relations has 
never not been located within the family—discursively or 
otherwise.”18 While I do not entirely agree with Gavigan’s dismissal 
of the analytic purchase of reprivatization, her critique does suggest 
that those of us deploying the concept need to be more cautious in 
not overstating our claims.  
  
 While Autonomous Motherhood is very much within the 
tradition of scholarship claiming that the rise of the neo-liberal state 
involved a marked shift in the discourses of self-sufficiency and 
fiscal responsibility, there is also a way in which its arguments 
actually endorse a more modest claim. Some of the analysis in the 
early chapters downgrades the claim about privatization, in so far as 
it demonstrates the extent to which these costs of social reproduction 
have always been privatized. The authors note that before the advent 
of the welfare state, the state sought to privatize these costs and the 
social welfare state never fully socialized these costs. For example, 
the discussion of the Children of Unmarried Parents Acts in the 
1920s, in Chapter Three, illustrates the privatizing impulse of the 
legislation:   
 
The three provinces other than Nova Scotia focused 
on enabling individuals to bring suits against putative 
fathers to compensate for expenses that these 
individuals incurred in providing necessities to 
illegitimate children. Nova Scotia’s legislation was 
initially geared towards compensating the public 
                                                 
18  Gavigan, supra note 16 at 298. 
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authorities that bore the costs of illegitimacy by 
providing local governments a remedy against the 
father.19 
 
 With the rise of the welfare state, the ideologies of motherhood 
did allow for some limited “legitimate” forms of dependency for 
some women,20 but the costs of social reproduction were never fully 
socialized.21 In the post-welfare neo-liberal state, there has certainly 
been a marked shift again, with the rise of new ideology of 
responsibilization and a rejection of the once-limited legitimate 
dependency. But, the recognition of the privatizing impulses of the 
state in earlier eras surveyed in Autonomous Motherhood is a 
reminder that those of us working on questions of privatization and 
family law in the neo-liberal era might be well advised to make our 
claims with more nuance and precision.  
 
 Neo-liberalism as a concept risks becoming both under- and 
over-explanatory. This is not to say that it is not or should not be a 
relevant analytic, but simply that we ought to take somewhat greater 
care in the deployment of a term that is at risk of becoming overly 
capacious. Indeed, in my reading of Autonomous Motherhood, I was 
struck by the potential relevance of a slightly different feature of 
neo-liberal governance—namely, its reliance on self-governance. 
Foucault’s work on governmentality described the technologies of 
the self as a form of governance “which permit the individual to 
                                                 
19  Boyd et al, supra note 1 at 64.  
20  See e.g. Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, "A Genealogy of Dependency: 
Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State" (Winter 1994) 19:2 Signs 
309. 
21  Gavigan, supra note 16. See also Shelley A.M. Gavigan & Dorothy E. 
Chunn, “From Mother's Allowance to Mothers Need Not Apply: Canadian 
Welfare Law as Liberal and Neo-Liberal Reform” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 733. 
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effect by their own means or with the help of others a number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conducts and 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”22 
Building on this concept of self-governance, governmentality 
scholars such as Nickolas Rose have argued that neo-liberalism 
deploys a distinctive form of governance that presupposes the 
freedom of the governed; indeed, according to Rose, freedom 
becomes the very terrain of the governance.23 
 
 Admittedly, my own scholarship has taken a marked turn 
towards this concept of self-governance, and no doubt, like a 
hammer, I see everything as a self-governing nail.24 Yet the insights 
of Autonomous Motherhood seem to be consistent with and 
supplemented by the idea that choice has become a central terrain of 
neo-liberal self-governance. Returning to the question of 
autonomy—so central to Autonomous Motherhood—I would place a 
slightly different emphasis on its role. The authors emphasize the 
extent to which these women do not question the assumptions of 
self-sufficiency, but internalize them. It is not that the single women 
in the study have simply been “absorbing” or “internalizing” the 
                                                 
22  Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self” in Luther H Martin, Huck 
Gutman & Patrick H Hutton, eds, Technologies of the Self (Amherst: 
University of Massahusetts Press, 1988) at 18. 
23  Nikolas Rose, The Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
24  See e.g. Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural 
Regulation of Sex and Belonging (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2007); Brenda Cossman, “The ‘Opt Out Revolution’ and the 
Changing Narratives of Motherhood: Self Governing the Work/Family 
Conflict” (2009) Utah L Rev 455; Brenda Cossman “Anxiety Governance” 
(Fall 2013) 38 Law and Soc Inquiry 892.  
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discourse or ideologies of self-sufficiency; there is a passivity to the 
language that gestures towards an older feminist notion of false 
consciousness. Rather, I would cast their articulation of their 
experiences through the lens of neo-liberal self-governance, where 
agency, freedom, and choice have become the very terrain of 
governance itself. The women are making choices—as they strongly 
expressed. It may seem like I am quibbling with words—not so 
much constraints that are internalized—but rather actual agency that 
is being exercised, through the normativity of neo-liberal 
governance that demands responsibilitization. Yet, for me, this self-
governance lens allows us to take choice and agency seriously—
these women are really making choices—yet also recognizing the 
extent to which choice has become a mechanism of governance. 
This is not so much a criticism of Autonomous Motherhood as a 
suggestion of some of the ways in which the book provides a rich 
basis for further scholarship on feminist agency, choice, and self-
governance generally and on intimate, familial, and parenting 
relationships in particular.  
 
 None of my comments should be taken as detracting from my 
view that Autonomous Motherhood is a wonderful and welcome 
contribution to feminist socio-legal literature. It will be of broad 
interest to scholars of socio-legal feminism, feminist legal history, 
diversifying family and kinship forms, and critical legal studies. It is 
a model of collaborative scholarship, nuanced legal analysis 
complemented by empirical sociological research, and rich 
theoretical inquiry. As one of the first major studies of women who 
choose to parent alone, it raises provocative, timely, and important 
questions, and will provide the basis for future scholarship on single 
motherhood, relational autonomy, and legal regulation. 
 
 
